New Host Config: Vulnerability Scan
7 min read
•
Jun 11, 2020
• Mark A. McFate
Today I elected to run a vulnerability scan against our new instance of the docker-traefik2-acme-host configuration that’s running on static.grinnell.edu. The command I used, and the results, are posted below.
╭─islandora@dgdockerx ~
╰─$ /home/islandora/testssl.sh/testssl.sh static.grinnell.edu
###########################################################
testssl.sh 3.0rc4 from https://testssl.sh/dev/
This program is free software. Distribution and
modification under GPLv2 permitted.
USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK!
Please file bugs @ https://testssl.sh/bugs/
###########################################################
Using "OpenSSL 1.0.2-chacha (1.0.2k-dev)" [~183 ciphers]
on dgdockerx:/home/islandora/testssl.sh/bin/openssl.Linux.x86_64
(built: "Jan 18 17:12:17 2019", platform: "linux-x86_64")
Start 2020-06-11 17:33:25 -->> 132.161.151.30:443 (static.grinnell.edu) <<--
rDNS (132.161.151.30): vaf.grinnell.edu. rootstalk.grinnell.edu. static.grinnell.edu. rootstalk-static.grinnell.edu.
Service detected: HTTP
Testing protocols via sockets except NPN+ALPN
SSLv2 not offered (OK)
SSLv3 not offered (OK)
TLS 1 offered
TLS 1.1 offered
TLS 1.2 offered (OK)
TLS 1.3 offered (OK): final
NPN/SPDY not offered
ALPN/HTTP2 h2, http/1.1 (offered)
Testing cipher categories
NULL ciphers (no encryption) not offered (OK)
Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication) not offered (OK)
Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL) not offered (OK)
LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4] (w/o export) not offered (OK)
Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA offered (NOT ok)
Average: SEED + 128+256 Bit CBC ciphers offered
Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) offered (OK)
Testing robust (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4
PFS is offered (OK) TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
Elliptic curves offered: prime256v1 secp384r1 secp521r1 X25519
Testing server preferences
Has server cipher order? yes (OK) -- only for < TLS 1.3
Negotiated protocol TLSv1.3
Negotiated cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Cipher order
TLSv1: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA AES128-SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
TLSv1.1: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA AES128-SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
TLSv1.2: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 AES256-GCM-SHA384 AES256-SHA
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA AES128-GCM-SHA256 AES128-SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
TLSv1.3: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Testing server defaults (Server Hello)
TLS extensions (standard) "session ticket/#35" "renegotiation info/#65281" "EC point formats/#11" "supported versions/#43"
"key share/#51" "application layer protocol negotiation/#16"
Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint no -- no lifetime advertised
SSL Session ID support yes
Session Resumption Tickets no, ID: no
TLS clock skew Random values, no fingerprinting possible
Signature Algorithm SHA256 with RSA
Server key size RSA 2048 bits
Server key usage Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
Server extended key usage TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
Serial / Fingerprints 035B28222F66FCE82AB86834D316C249EDB3 / SHA1 385FFF215983EFA46B2CAFCA6768356348475307
SHA256 F2A91B6B1BE83479550EE679AEA78B9551CA00D1D5BC0DA4B80D1FA1B4E3ED25
Common Name (CN) static.grinnell.edu (CN in response to request w/o SNI: TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT)
subjectAltName (SAN) static.grinnell.edu
Issuer Let's Encrypt Authority X3 (Let's Encrypt from US)
Trust (hostname) Ok via SAN and CN (SNI mandatory)
Chain of trust NOT ok (chain incomplete)
EV cert (experimental) no
"eTLS" (visibility info) not present
Certificate Validity (UTC) 88 >= 30 days (2020-06-10 11:51 --> 2020-09-08 11:51)
# of certificates provided 1
Certificate Revocation List --
OCSP URI http://ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org
OCSP stapling not offered
OCSP must staple extension --
DNS CAA RR (experimental) not offered
Certificate Transparency yes (certificate extension)
Testing HTTP header response @ "/"
HTTP Status Code 200 OK
HTTP clock skew 0 sec from localtime
Strict Transport Security not offered
Public Key Pinning --
Server banner nginx/1.17.10
Application banner --
Cookie(s) (none issued at "/")
Security headers --
Reverse Proxy banner --
Testing vulnerabilities
Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) not vulnerable (OK), no heartbeat extension
CCS (CVE-2014-0224) not vulnerable (OK)
Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244), experiment. not vulnerable (OK), reply empty
ROBOT not vulnerable (OK)
Secure Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) not vulnerable (OK)
Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation not vulnerable (OK)
CRIME, TLS (CVE-2012-4929) not vulnerable (OK)
BREACH (CVE-2013-3587) no HTTP compression (OK) - only supplied "/" tested
POODLE, SSL (CVE-2014-3566) not vulnerable (OK)
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV (RFC 7507) Downgrade attack prevention supported (OK)
SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183, CVE-2016-6329) VULNERABLE, uses 64 bit block ciphers
FREAK (CVE-2015-0204) not vulnerable (OK)
DROWN (CVE-2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703) not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)
make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services
https://censys.io/ipv4?q=F2A91B6B1BE83479550EE679AEA78B9551CA00D1D5BC0DA4B80D1FA1B4E3ED25 could help you to find out
LOGJAM (CVE-2015-4000), experimental not vulnerable (OK): no DH EXPORT ciphers, no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2
BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) TLS1: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA AES128-SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
DES-CBC3-SHA
VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2 (likely mitigated)
LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS. Check patches
RC4 (CVE-2013-2566, CVE-2015-2808) no RC4 ciphers detected (OK)
Testing 370 ciphers via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength
Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x1302 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH 253 AESGCM 256 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
x1303 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ECDH 253 ChaCha20 256 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
xc030 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH 521 AESGCM 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
xc014 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDH 521 AES 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
xcca8 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ECDH 521 ChaCha20 256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
x9d AES256-GCM-SHA384 RSA AESGCM 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
x35 AES256-SHA RSA AES 256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
x1301 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH 253 AESGCM 128 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
xc02f ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH 521 AESGCM 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
xc013 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA ECDH 521 AES 128 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
x9c AES128-GCM-SHA256 RSA AESGCM 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
x2f AES128-SHA RSA AES 128 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
xc012 ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA ECDH 521 3DES 168 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
x0a DES-CBC3-SHA RSA 3DES 168 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
Running client simulations (HTTP) via sockets
Android 4.2.2 TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 521 bit ECDH (P-521)
Android 4.4.2 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 521 bit ECDH (P-521)
Android 5.0.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 521 bit ECDH (P-521)
Android 6.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Android 7.0 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Chrome 65 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Chrome 70 Win 10 TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Firefox 59 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Firefox 62 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
IE 6 XP No connection
IE 7 Vista TLSv1.0 AES128-SHA, No FS
IE 8 Win 7 TLSv1.0 AES128-SHA, No FS
IE 8 XP TLSv1.0 DES-CBC3-SHA, No FS
IE 11 Win 7 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
IE 11 Win 8.1 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
IE 11 Win Phone 8.1 TLSv1.2 AES128-SHA, No FS
IE 11 Win 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Edge 13 Win 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Edge 13 Win Phone 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Edge 15 Win 10 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 253 bit ECDH (X25519)
Safari 9 iOS 9 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Safari 9 OS X 10.11 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Safari 10 OS X 10.12 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Apple ATS 9 iOS 9 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Tor 17.0.9 Win 7 TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Java 6u45 No connection
Java 7u25 TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Java 8u161 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Java 9.0.4 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
OpenSSL 1.0.1l TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 521 bit ECDH (P-521)
OpenSSL 1.0.2e TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 256 bit ECDH (P-256)
Done 2020-06-11 17:34:48 [ 85s] -->> 132.161.151.30:443 (static.grinnell.edu) <<--
Controling TLS Ciphers
In previous server configs that used Traefik v1.x I was able to eliminate some potential vulnerabilities by removing old, weak ciphers. In that old environment I used a few command: options in the docker-compose.yml file along with a declaration of stronger ciphers in a traefik.toml file. That config change is documented in Removing Traefik Weak Ciphers.
In our new configuration, which uses Traefik v2.x, TLS cipher control is quite different. I used this post as guidance and subsequently ended up with these modified files:
docker-compose.yml
version: "3.3"
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:2.2.1
container_name: traefik
hostname: traefik
restart: unless-stopped
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
command:
--log.level=DEBUG
--api.insecure=true
--providers.docker=true
--providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false
--providers.file.directory=/certs
--providers.file.watch=true
--providers.file.filename=/traefik-tls.toml
--entrypoints.web.address=:80
--entrypoints.websecure.address=:443
networks:
- proxy
labels:
traefik.enable: true
# next 4 lines...universal http --> https redirect per https://community.containo.us/t/a-global-http-https-redirection/864/3
traefik.http.routers.http-catchall.rule: hostregexp(`{host:[a-z-.]+}`)
traefik.http.routers.http-catchall.entrypoints: web
traefik.http.routers.http-catchall.middlewares: redirect-to-https
traefik.http.middlewares.redirect-to-https.redirectscheme.scheme: websecure
# now the Traefik-specific dashboard stuff
traefik.http.middlewares.traefik-auth.basicauth.users: admin:$$2y$$05$$pJEzHJBzfoYYS7/hGAedcOP8XdsqNXE7j.LHFBVjueASOqOvvjGOy
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.entrypoints: websecure
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.rule: Host(`${HOST}`) && (PathPrefix(`/api`) || PathPrefix(`/dashboard`))
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.middlewares: traefik-auth
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.tls: true
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.service: api@internal
traefik.http.routers.traefik-secure.tls.options: default
ports:
- 80:80
- 443:443
- 8080:8080
volumes:
- /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
- ../certs:/certs
networks:
proxy:
external: true
Note that in the above file I also changed the labels: syntax and removed a number of cumbersome quotation marks while doing so.
traefik-tls.toml
[tls.options]
[tls.options.default]
minVersion = "VersionTLS13"
[tls.options.tls12]
minVersion = "VersionTLS12"
cipherSuites = [
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305",
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"
]
No Effect
Unfortunately, as you can see in the testssl.sh output at the top of this post, two potential vulnerabilities remain. Still, this new syntax should enable me to take control of TLS configuration if it does become necessary.
And that’s a wrap. Until next time…